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A SOVIET MODEL FOR MARXIAN
SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS
John N. Hazardt
A Soviet columnist, said to represent Kremlin views,' has

roundly denounced 2 the constitution adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on

January 17, 1975.3 The Soviet commentator sees the new basic
Chinese law as a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and proof that the
Chinese leadership has, in effect, withdrawn China from the

socialist commonwealth.
The current Soviet criticism raises questions about the relationship between the U.S.S.R. constitution of 1936 and constitu-

tions of other Socialist states. Has the Soviet constitution become a
model to which Marxist-oriented statesmen must adhere on pain of

loss of membership in the socialist commonwealth? No formal
claim of this nature has ever been made, but is current Soviet

criticism introducing a new pattern of orthodoxy? This paper,
written in honor of that pioneer in North America of the comparative legal method, Rudolf B. Scblesinger, is designed to explore
that possibility.
I
THE SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

At the very outset, a Westerner is likely to ask why constitutions within the socialist commonwealth loom large in Soviet eyes.
Such constitutions are changed frequently, not only by amendment
but in their entirety, suggesting that they have no lasting influence
comparable to the hoary constitution of the United States. Except
t Professor of Public Law, Columbia University Law School; B.A. 1930, Yale; LL.B.
1934, Harvard; J.S.D. 1939, Chicago.
I James F. Clarity identifies I. Aleksandrov as "a pseudonym often appearing on
articles expressing the Kremlin view on important issues." N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1975, at 9,
col. 1.
Aleksandrov, Lozungi i praktika. 0 novoi konstitutsii KNR [Slogans and Practice. Comment
on the New Constitution of the PRC], Pravda, Feb. 5, 1974, at 4-5. For English translation, see
XXVII Cuo
TrrDiGEST OF THE SoviEr PREss, Feb. 26, 1975, at 1-5.
3 An English translation of the text is published in News from Hsinhua News Agency of
China (London), Special Issue: Fourth NationalPeople's Congress, People'sRepublic of China, Jan.
22, 1975. Also published in PEKING REvxmw, Jan. 24, 1975, at 12,17 and Background on
China, Chinese Information Service (Taiwan), Document B 75-03, Jan. 21, 1975.
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for Yugoslavia, socialist constitutions provide no judicial review to
hold the executive and legislative organs of government to strict
observance of their provisions. 4 They seem to be, in the words of a
senior Western scholar, "basically action programs to be translated
into political practice. '5 Indeed, it is sometimes asked in the West
why a political system which expresses in its legal codes a desire to
preserve flexibility in the application of law6 bothers to enact a
constitution at all. In Western eyes, a Soviet-type constitution is not
conceived to be an instrument of restraint upon those who make
and execute governmental policy.
Yet, constitutions loom large in the Marxian socialist literature.
The current Soviet comment on the Chinese document reflects this
viewpoint in its statement: "For every socialist country, the adoption
of a constitution-the basic law of the state-is a major event because
in this way the basic rights of the working people and their political
and social gains on the path of the construction of a new society are
consolidated ."' This is but a restatement by a political journalist of
what legal scholars have been saying with increasing vehemence ever
since the death of Stalin in 1953. Books and articles treat the U.S.S.R.
constitution as standing above the routine codes and statutes; it is at
the pinnacle of the hierarchy of legal instruments,8 a norm to which
the legislature must adhere even though no institution but the
legislature itself could require a constitutional amendment to validate
what it wishes to do. Even a dissident who has made his way to the
United States tells American readers that protesters in Moscow
appeal to the leadership to conform to the constitution because they
think it sufficiently revered in the Kremlin to restrain abuse of law. 9
4 Constitutions of socialist commonwealth states ai they stood in 1965 are published in
English translation in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES (J.
Triska ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as Triska].
' Loewenstein, Constitutions and ConstitutionalLaw in the West and in the East, 30
POL. Sci. 203 (1969).

INDIAN

J.

6 See Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, art. 5, in
SovxET CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE (Y. Sdobnikov transl. 1962), which was carried
into the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R. as art. 5, in CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET
FEDERATED SOCILIST REPUBLIC (W. Gray & R. Stults transl. 1965). The same principle of
flexibility had been incorporated into the 1926 Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. as art. 16
prior to its removal from the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law of the U.S.S.R. and
Union Republics, enacted in 1958.
" See Aleksandrov, supra note 2,. at 1, col. I (English transl.). Chang Chun-chiao, when
introducing the draft constitution to the Fourth National People's Congress on Jan. 13, 1975,
quoted Mao Tse-tung as having said that "an organization must have rules, and a state also
must have rules; the constitution is a set of general rules and is a fundamental charter."

Hsinhua News Agency, supra note 3, at 8.
s See M. FARBER & V. RZHEVSKII, VOPROSY

TEORII SOVETSKOGO

PRAVA [QUESTIONS ON THE THEORY OF SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW]

KONSTITUTSIONNOGO

36 (1967).

9 See V. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION

53 (1974).

MARXIAN CONSTITUTIONS

1975]

Another safeguard is the "Procurator General," appointed by
the legislature, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, to protest to the
legislature executive acts that violate the constitution.' ° Since Stalin's death, this official is reported to have been active in requesting
offending agencies to rescind administrative orders that appear to
violate the constitution." To date, no such protest seems to have
gone unheeded; at least no refusal to rescind has been taken
before the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet for invalidation.
Although constitutions in the socialist commonwealth are
amended easily, and the legislature is its own judge of the necessity
of amendment prior to enacting a law, the constitutions have
become repositories of some provisions already in the codes and
seemingly in no need of restatement. This suggests that in the eyes
of their creators constitutions have psychological value for the
general public. Thus, when the right of inheritance is guaranteed
by a constitution, the draftsmen probably believe that the guarantee indicates a stable policy that will induce citizens to save without
fear of sudden amendment of the code.
Numerous Marxian socialist states in Eastern Europe and Asia
joined the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia after World War II in adopting
constitutions. None of the published record suggests that the
drafting process was fraught with conflict with Soviet colleagues
over content or form. Perhaps this lack of debate stems from the
respect accorded Soviet experience by the draftsmen; perhaps it
stems from the presence of Soviet advisers who urged adherence to
the Soviet model; perhaps it stems from the common habit of
lawyers everywhere to look to other lands for models to guide
them. 2 Only the Yugoslavs, after their break with Stalin,13 and the
Chinese, after their break with Khrushchev,1 4 hinted that they were
pressed too hard to accept Soviet advice to make that advice
palatable.
Despite these indications of the pressures exerted by Soviet
advisers, and the evident similarity of many provisions of the
10 CONSTITUTION

(FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

art. 113 (1936),

reprinted in Triska 50. See also B. GALKIN, ORGANIZATSIIA SUDA I PROKURATURY V SSSR [THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT AND OF THE PROCURACY IN THE USSR] 174

(1967).
11 Such activity is reported in the Procuracy's journal. See, e.g., 7 Sotsialistichekaia
Zakonnost' 85 (1966), in which the procuracy successfuly protested the unconstitutional
election of a secretary of a village soviet.
12

The influence of models is well known in the West. Consider the Australian and

Argentinian reliance upon the model of the U.S.A. when drafting their constitutions, and
the contemporary use by Francophonic states of Africa of the French constitutional model.
13

This information comes from a private conversation with a Yugoslav jurist.

14 See Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China: An Introduction, 79
HARV.

L. REv. 469, 483-84 (1966).
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constitutions, there has been no indication that absolute conformity
to the Soviet model was required. Simple comparison of texts
demonstrates this point. Structures of government differ: some
constitutions create a single head of state instead of the Soviet
collective head; 15 some create Councils of State rather than the
Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; 16 some organize local
government under centrally appointed officials rather than under
the locally chosen executive committees of local soviets in the
U.S.S.R.;1 7 some even introduce a two or three party system
18
instead of the monopoly one party system of the U.S.S.R.
Indications of the degree of conformity required among the
members of the socialist commonwealth began to emerge in 1957
when all of the twelve communist parties then in power, exclusive
of Tito's renegade Yugoslavia, adopted a resolution in Moscow on
fundamental principles to be observed by commonwealth members. These were not stated in the form of a recommended
constitution but as "basic laws applicable in all countries embarking
on a socialist course."' 9 They established such generalities as:
guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of
which is the Marxist-Leninist party; abolition of capitalist ownership; gradual socialist construction of agriculture; national
economic planning; restructuring ideology in a socialist direction;
equality of ethnically differentiated peoples; and proletarian internationalism. So long as these principles were observed, the form in
which they were to be expressed seems to have been left to the
communist party of each of the states to work out for itself. A
Soviet professor said as much in addressing an international faculty
of comparative law in Belgium in 1965.20
When Fidel Castro brought Cuba into the socialist common's See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA art. 48
(1948), reprinted in Triska 247; CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC art.

61 (1960), reprinted in Triska 441.
16 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC arts. 16-28 (as amended,

1952), reprinted in Triska 336-38.
17 This model was adopted by Poland in 1944. The system was retained until 1950,
when the Soviet model was introduced. I have set forth the details in my COMMUNISTS AND
THEIR LAw 48-49 (1969).
I When more than one political party is permitted to function, the relationship must be
one in which the communist party leads the others in what a Polish scholar has called a
permanent coalition. See S. ROZMARYN, LA POLOGNE 73 (1966), vol. 8 in the series Comment ils
sont gouvernis.
19 English translation published in THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 169, 176 (2d ed. D.

Jacobs 1961).
'0 Professor Krutogolov in an unpublished lecture to students at the International

Faculty for the Teaching of Comparative Law, Liege, Belgium, on Aug. 11, 1965.
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wealth as the fourteenth member in 1959, he contented himself at
first with amending his country's 1940 constitution. In practice, he
soon went beyond even his amendments.2 1 He had planned a new
socialist constitution for years, but a draft emerged only in April
1975.2 This meant that for years the Soviet communist party's
leaders tolerated the presence within the commonwealth of a state
without a modern socialist constitution, either because the principles applied in practice conformed to those of 1957 or because
they knew that an acceptable draft was in preparation.
In light of this history of constitutional variation, why is there
Soviet criticism of the new Chinese basic law, and why does it attack
form as well as content? In this latter respect, exception is taken at
the outset of the Soviet critic's article to the abbreviated form the
Chinese have chosen for the expression of their ideas.2 3 This
abbreviation is noted as especially undesirable in the chapter on
rights and duties of citizens, in which the original 1954 constitution's nineteen articles are reduced to four with numerous paragraphs. Outsiders may ask why length matters if the Cubans have
been accepted with no socialist constitution at all.
II
THE PROBLEM OF PREAMBLES

The Soviet critic begins his denunciation with the Chinese
preamble. This is hardly surprising since the Sino-Soviet rift has
been characterized by tilting in ideological terms, and preambles
are traditionally the place to express ideology. The Soviet model of
1936 offers no guidande, for there is no preamble. This absence
was Stalin's doing, for when his militants asked for a preamble
emulating the statement of Marxist principles in the first constitu21 The history of the Cuban constitutional process is set out in Draper, On the Cuban
Constitutional Problem, in Triska 256.
22 For the Spanish text, see Granma (Havana) April 20, 1975. The Draft incorporates

several provisions similar to those suggested for the new U.S.S.R. constitution still in
committee and is responsive to the Soviet criticism of the 1975 Chinese constitution. Thus,
there is a preamble in the form of a revolutionary manifesto; a Chapter 1 stating the
fundamental political, social and economic principles to govern the state; a Chapter 2 on
citizenship, followed by four chapters of 32 articles enumerating in detail the protection to
be afforded civil rights. Subsequent chapters define the state structure, including the
judiciary and the procuracy. Finally, there is a seven-article chapter on elections and a
chapter on amendment.
23 The number of articles has been reduced from 106 in the constitution of 1954 to 30
in the constitution of 1975. The U.S.S.R. constitution of 1936, still in force, contains 146
articles.
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tion of 1918,24 he said it was unnecessary, arguing that a constitution was not a program but was only a vehicle to establish a state
25
structure.
When the Eastern European states promulgated their first
constitutions after the war, not all of them followed Stalin's 1936
position on preambles. No preamble was placed in the constitutions
of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, but preambles of
varying lengths appear in those of Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, and Poland. In the Far East, lengthy preambles
were included in the constitutions of the People's Republic of China
and North Vietnam, but there was no preamble in that of North
Korea. The possibility of reversion to the 1918 style was intimated in
the U.S.S.R. when Khrushchev began his revision of Stalin's document after the latter's death, 26 and rumors persist that the draft
currently in committee contains a preamble.
Preambles have varied in what they include, but the basic idea
is orthodox Marxism: the state is declared to have as its purpose
the elimination of exploitation of man by man; it is to establish the
alliance of workers and peasants. Some preambles denounce the
bourgeois or even the feudal leaders of the past.27 Some express
the inspiration gained from the example and support of the
U.S.S.R.2 8 China's first constitution of 1954 declared the victory of
the Chinese people led by the communist party of China, and
declared the state a people's democratic dictatorship engaged in a
step-by-step transition to socialism through socialist industrialization and transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist
industry and commerce. It declared all the ethnic groups in the
country united in one great family of free and equal nationalities,
and anticipated the further development of fraternal bonds and
mutual aid on the basis of opposition to imperialism, to public
enemies within their own ranks, and to both big-nation chauvinism
24 The 1918 constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. is published in English translation in Triska
2.
25 See Stalin, On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R., Nov. 25, 1936, in J. STALIN,
PROBLEMS OF LENINiSM 679 (transl. of 1 th ed., Moscow, 1954). There was no preamble in
the first federal constitution of 1923, reprinted in Triska 17.
26 See Romashkin, Novyi etap v ravitiisovetskogo gosudarstva [A New Stage in the Development
of the Soviet State], SovErsKoE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, Oct. 1960, at 31. For English translation, see XII CuRREr

DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 14, 1960, at 3 (1960).

27 See, e.g., Provisional Constitution of the People's Republic of China of Sept. 29, 1949,
entitled The Common Programof the Chinese People'sPolitical Consultative Conference, reprinted
in Triska 90; CONSTITUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1949), reprinted in Triska
182; CONSTITUTION OFTHE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (1959), reprinted in Triska 198.
28 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, supra note 27;
CONSTITUTION OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

(1961), reprinted in Triska 315.
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and local nationalism. A final paragraph spoke of the indestructible
friendship with the great U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies.
Departure from these principles by the current Chinese
draftsmen irks the Soviet critic of 1975. He decries elimination of
the declaration that the Chinese state is in step-by-step transition to
a socialist society through socialist transformation of the economy.
The critic thinks sinister the new declaration that the state is no
farther along the road to communism than the stage of socialist
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that during
the contemporary stage there will continue to be class conflicts and
struggle until socialist society ends with the achievement of complete communism. Presumably, this formulation means to the
Soviet critic that class warfare will be unrelenting until the state
withers away with the achievement of a society in which people
need no compulsion to do what needs to be done to keep society
productive and orderly.
To the Soviet critic, such an attitude means that the Chinese
are prepared to continue the turbulent stage of the revolution for
many years without moderation of the struggle by degrees as
socialist society advances through successive steps away from
capitalism. It means a deemphasis of legal guarantees of fair
treatment of citizens, and it represents a rejection of the 1961
program of the communist party of the U.S.S.R. which, in an
announcement that the state had become a state of the entire
people, had declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat had
fulfilled its historic mission in the U.S.S.R.2 a
In contrast to the current Chinese formulation, the Soviets
announce that their class struggle is formally at an end, meaning
that the emphasis has changed from group repression to individual
repression, and the latter is to occur only When violation of law is
proven in court. This was declared in 1958 when the post-Stalin
revision of the fundamental principles of criminal procedure occurred. 30 While dissidents within the U.S.S.R. reveal that the ideal
of legality has yet to be achieved, there is evident a moderation in
the severity of Stalin's policies of mass exile to work camps on
nothing more than a finding by an administrative board of "social
danger," and there are no more executions based on confessions
exacted through torture. China's refusal to accept this formula29

Part II, § III. English translation in SoviEr

COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES

J. Triska ed. 1962).
30 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure, art. 3. English translation in

97-98

FUNDA-

MENTALS OF SoviL-r CRIMINAL LEGISLATION, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL COURT

PROCEDURE

(1960).
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tion marking departure from terrorist methods attracts Soviet ire
because at this stage, twenty-five years after coming to power, the
Chinese ought to have achieved some formal stability.
The Soviet critic also attacks the Chinese policy toward ethnic
minorities. His argument is that the new constitution departs from
the 1954 language which'pledged the state "[i]n the course of
economic construction and cultural development... [to] concern
itself with the needs of the different nationalities, and, in the matter of socialist transformation, [to] pay full attention to the special
characteristics in the development of each nationality. '3 1 The 1975
revision says only: "We should consolidate the great unity of the
people of all nationalities led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants, and develop the revolutionary
united front. 13 2 To the Soviet critic, this again marks a change of
emphasis from respect for local cultures to pressure for unity.
Quite expectably, the Soviet critic objects to the omission of the
entire paragraph from the 1954 document which spoke for friendship with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies, and for
continuation of a firm and consistent policy toward achievement of
the noble aims of peace and progress of mankind. When read with
the assertion in the new preamble that there is a danger of
capitalist restoration and the threat of subversion and aggression by
imperialism and social imperialism, and that these threats must be
opposed along with the hegemony of the superpowers, this omission is seen as ominous. It is anti-Soviet, for the Chinese have been
calling the U.S.S.R. a superpower and a social imperialist for some
time. 33 To use the epithet "social imperialist," according to the
critic, is to conceal China's withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth.
III
THE STRUCTURES OF SOCIALISM

Article 1 of the 1975 Chinese constitution identifies China as a
"socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the
3'

CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

preamble (1954, repealed 1975),

reprinted in Triska 108.
32 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA

preamble (1975).

33 In discussing' Soviet policy with a delegation of overseas Chinese in 1974, Teng

Hsiao-ping said: "In exactly 20 years, from 1953 to 1973, the Soviet Union changed. At
home, capitalism was restored. In the international arena, the Tsarist road was followed. It
can be said that it has completely followed the U.S. road and contend[s] for world hegemony
with it. After a metamorphosis of 20 years, it has become social imperialism which has
brought great disasters to the world." U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report: People's Republic of China, Dec. 10, 1974, at El, E4 (transl. of Chinese text).
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working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. 3 4
This formulation looks orthodox enough, and the Soviet critic says
he can endorse it, as well as the statement in Article 2 that the
communist party of China is "the core of leadership of the whole
Chinese people" and that through it "the working class exercises
leadership over the state."3 5 However, the critic finds these correct
formulations insincere in light of the reality of contemporary
China in which the communist party has lost its authenticity and
has become "an obedient tool in the hands of a narrow militarybureaucratic grouping. 3 6
Further, the declaration that Maoism is to be added to Marxism-Leninism to create a new triad of sources of inspiration appears
to the Soviet critic to be an attempt "to unite the ununitable,' 37 for
Maoism is seen to be in principle an enemy of Marxism-Leninism.
The critic bases this conclusion on the theory that class struggle
continues. Under Marxist-Leninist theory, class struggle should be
over or at least approaching an end. Maoism, in fostering class
struggle twenty-five years after coming to power, is, in Soviet eyes,
attempting to legalize terror and repression of those who are displeased with the Maoist regime. Mao has no right to speak for
continuing class struggle, in the critic's eyes, when his constitution
provides that private ownership of productive property shall no
longer exist so that the only property ownership is that of the state
and of the socialist collective, i.e., the cooperative. The critic asks,
how can capitalism be restored under such circumstances? In short,
the critic sees Mao defining "class" differently from the orthodox
Marxist definition which relates it to ownership or lack of ownership
of the means of production.
Article 13, calling for "[s]peaking out freely, airing views fully,
holding great debates and writing big-character posters" 38 as new
forms of socialist revolution created by the masses, is ridiculed as
approval of activities not devised by the masses to restrain the
arbitrary acts of the bureaucracy, but instead to legalize Mao's
campaign to destroy the communist party and the state organs
modelled on the "soviet" of the U.S.S.R. Here, the critic is indirectly
castigating those who ousted the late President Liu Shao-chi, who
adhered closely to U.S.S.R. models for both party and state and won
U.S.S.R. acclaim. Ever since Liu's removal, Soviet critics have
34

CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

OF CHINA art.

1 (1975).

35 Id. art. 2.
36 Aleksandrov, supra note 2, at 3, col 1 (English transl.).
37 Id.
38

CONSTrruTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

art.

13 (1975).
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proclaimed that the entity calling itself the communist party is very
different from its prototype in the U.S.S.R., as it lacks in leadership
functions and is subservient to the army and to the state bureaucracy. 39 Also, the local government system has been changed from the
soviet pattern; "revolutionary committees" which govern the provinces
subordinate the party to the army and completely eliminate the
people themselves from having any influence on local policy-making.
There is some crowing by the Soviet critic over new constitutional provisions that suggest that the Chinese have learned a
lesson from the failure of their program of egalitarian treatment of
wages and from the abolition of all private incentive from the
agricultural commune. Stalin declared in 1930 that egalitarianism
was a petty-bourgeois utopian expectation. 40 The Soviet system has
emphasized since that time that communism can become a reality
only if people are paid in accordance with what they do, not in
accordance with what they need. Mao had criticized this approach,
reiterating at intervals that he would allow no wide departure from
egalitarianism in wage scales or in styles of living. 41 Indeed, he
criticized Khrushchev's differential wage system and uncontrolled
2
consumerism as "opening the gates to capitalism.14
The reversal of the egalitarian stand is seen by the Soviet critic
in Article 9. The provision repeats the Biblical injunction, also
found in the U.S.S.R. constitution, that "He who does not work,
neither shall he eat,"4 3 and adds to this the socialist principle "from
each according to his ability, to each according to his work," just as
44
the U.S.S.R. constitution does.
39 The Chinese structure of local government and the Soviet criticism are explained in
J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 62 (1969). For an example of Soviet criticism, see
PravdaEditorial Statement on China's Policies, XVIII CuRENr DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS,
Dec. 14, 1966, at 3, 6.
40 "Egalitarianism: A petty bourgeois utopian social theory, preaching equality of
property while preserving the principle of private ownership of the means of production." 4
TOLKOVYI SLOVAR' RUSSKOGO IAZYKA [AN EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN LAN-

GUAGE] 1393 (B. Volin, D. Ushakov & G. Vinokur eds. 1940).
41 Mao is quoted by a Soviet author as having said on April 29, 1967, 'The slogan 'to
each according to his work' is bourgeois." See Sladkovsky, Threat to the Economic Foundationsof

Socialism in China, 44 KOMMUNIST, Aug. 1967, at 92. English Translation in 6 REPRINTS
FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 1, 1968 at 3, 25. In spite of Mao's position, differentiated
scales of wages had returned to factories when the Revolutionary Councils began to function
in 1968.
42 See Letter of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, disclosed in July 1963. For English
translation of the text and of the Soviet reply, see XV CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS,
Aug. 7, 1963, at 3.
43 CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL

LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

art. 12 (1936), reprinted in Triska 60. See 2 Thessalonians 3:10.
44 CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

art. 12 (1936), reprinted in Triska 60.
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The reversal of the policy on agricultural communes is seen in
the guarantee of the new constitution that peasants may now
exploit small private garden plots and own small numbers of cattle
while working in the communal economy of the farm, called in
Chinese parlance the "production team." This means a return to
the Soviet-type incentive system. 45 The critic sees added cause for

rejoicing in abandonment of the large unit of the commune as the
accounting unit for agriculture in favor of return to the "team. 4 6
This is another indication that the wisdom of the Soviet system is
being recognized and that without saying as much the Chinese are
admitting that their claim to have advanced faster toward communism than the U.S.S.R. is false. Both now use the same structures.
IV
THE STATE INSTITUTIONS

When examining the state institutions, the Soviet critic once
again returns to what he sees as the dominant role of the army,
and he adds to this a comment on the commune as a replacement
for the "soviet" at the bottom level of the administrative pyramid.
Ever since they emerged, both the "revolutionary committee" at
the province level and the "commune" at the local level have been
criticized by Soviet spokesmen. The revolutionary committee is
seen to have come under army dominance resulting in the subordination of the party cadres who used to guide in typical U.S.S.R.
fashion at the provincial level. The critic ignores the specific
language of Article 15 of the new constitution as well as recent
Chinese leadership pronouncements that the party is to be restored
to its dominant position, with the army in a subordinate position,
albeit not removed entirely (as in the U.S.S.R.) from the governing
process. Perhaps the U.S.S.R.'s intelligence sources indicate that
the army remains China's supreme power despite protests to the
contrary. With regard to the commune as the local governing
agency, Soviet criticism has long been levelled at the fact that it
combines both political and economic administration in the same
"' CONSTrION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 7 (1975). This reversion to
private incentives preceded the new constitution, since the peasant communes had deprived
families of private plots and cattle only briefly during the initial period of communal
enthusiasm.
46 The restoration of the "team" to the position of basic unit was made in the Revised
Draft Regulation on the Work of the People's Communes, dated Sept. 1962. Reference to
this document appears in an article by Kuafig Hual in [1963] 1 CHNG-FA Y.N-CHUI 15. I am
indebted to Dr. Lin Fu-shun of the National University, Taiwan, for this information. This
being so, the 1975 constitution introduces nothing new but raises to the constitutional level
that status already established by law.
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unit, while the U.S.S.R. separates them. The collective farm conducts the economy; the local soviet conducts the government's
other business.
The Soviet critic faults the new constitution for failing to
insure popular participation in local government as under the
previous constitution. 47 The U.S.S.R. constitution devotes a whole
chapter to the subject;48 the new Chinese constitution provides
only: "Deputies to the People's Congresses at all levels are elected
through democratic consultation. 4 9a To the Soviet critic this means
that the ordinary citizen can have no schematic input into the
selection process.
Whether this criticism is mere rhetoric or actually reflects a
deep sense of difference is hard for the western outsider to judge
since Soviet elections occur on a one-candidate ballot prepared
after a round of nominations by meetings held on farms, in
factories, in educational institutions, and in state offices. These
meetings forward their choices of desirable candidates (which they
have made with the guidance of communist party members at the
meetings) to electoral commissions, which select the single candidate to appear on the ballot. There is no need here to discuss this
procedure, which has been analyzed at length by western scholars, 50
but it may be surmised that the Soviet critic deems it to be more
systematic than the consulting procedure in China.
Criticism is also directed at the top level organization of the
Chinese state agencies. It is noted that there will no longer be a
President. This change is seen by the Soviet critic as designed to
eliminate any possibility of juxtaposing criticism of the party chiefs
by a high state official. The criticism does not ring true, for in the
U.S.S.R. there is no individual President, only a collective presidency in the presidium of the Supreme Soviet that is dominated by
the communist party. It is hard to conceive of a President in a
traditional communist system who could serve as a counterweight
to the party, and it may be questioned whether the critic is
engaging here in anything but polemics.
The All-China Congress of People's Representatives is seen as
emasculated because nothing is said of its traditional role as implementer of the constitution, nor of its right to pardon and to
47 CONSTITUTION OF THE

PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA art.

56 (1954, repealed 1975),

reprinted in Triska 117.
48 CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL

LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

arts. 134-42 (1936), reprinted in Triska 75-76.
41 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 3 (1975).
50 See, e.g., M. MOTE, SOVIET LOCAL AND REPUBLIC ELECTIONS (1965).
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declare war, rights that exist within its counterpart in the U.S.S.R.,
the Supreme Soviet. Also decried is the elimination of guarantees
of deputies' immunity and of provisions for committees of the
Congress. This latter criticism springs from the increasing reliance
on committees of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to review legislative
drafts submitted by the government prior to enactment, and to
monitor economic policies in various fields. The effectiveness of
the committee system in the U.S.S.R. has been studied in depth in
the West. It has been concluded that members tend to be deputies
who have proved themselves reliable and professional, but that the
system does open the door in some degree to popular participation
in policy-making by a group larger than the Politburo of the
party. 5 1 The Soviet critic is saying that China's leaders are still
holding the reins too tightly when they should be expanding the
leadership group with the progress of socialism.
A second prong of the Soviet critic's attack on the restructuring of state agencies adds to his earlier criticism of Chinese ethnic
52
policy as embodied in the "unification" doctrine of the preamble.
He criticizes the new constitution for eliminating all provision for
representation of these minoiities. In the 1954 constitution, although there was no provision for ethnic republics as in the
U.S.S.R., there had been created a "Nationalities Committee"5 3
within the Congress, and there had been a chapter of six articles on
the local government of ethnic areas. 54 The 1975 constitution
eliminates the "Nationalities Committee" and abbreviates the chapter on ethnic area government to a single article, Article 4. It
eliminates provision for use of the local language by government
organs as well as the requirements that government assist in
development of the minority and submit to the Nationalities Committee proposed regulations on the exercise of its authority. The
new provisions also eliminate old Article 67, which required that
the form of self-government in ethnic areas be determined in
accordance with the wishes of the people of the area.
Finally, there has been what the Soviet critic describes as a
"considerable deformation of the provisions on the procuracy and
the People's Court."5 5 While the 1954 constitution devoted an
51

See Little, Soviet ParliamentaryCommittees afterKhrushchev: Obstaclesand Opportunities, 24

SOVIET STUDIES 41 (1972).
52 See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
53 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 34 (1954, repealed 1975),
reprinted in Triska 114.
54 Id. arts. 67-72, reprinted in Triska 119.

55 Aleksandrov; supra note 2, at 4, col. 2 (English transl.).
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entire chapter of twelve articles to the subject, 5 6 the present constitution reduces the number of articles in the chapter to two,
Articles 24 and 25. More importantly, it abolishes the procuracy,
which, as originally created in the Soviet model, had incorporated a
function of restraint on the illegal activity of bureaucrats along
with a prosecuting function. Under the new constitution there is to
be no formal institutional restraint on illegalities by the administration; even the prosecuting function is to be transferred to the
police. As for the judicial system, the Soviet critic considers the
elimination of the first constitution's procedural guarantees to the
accused, and also the naming of the president of the court by the
local revolutionary committee, to be the abandonment of restraint
on illegality.
V
A

BILL OF RIGHTS

Abbreviation of the 1954 bill of rights to four articles appears
ominous to the Soviet critic. Probably mindful of the increasing
interest of peoples of the Third World in bills of fights, the Soviet
critic is prepared to use the opening provided by the Chinese not
only to attack them but also to display the new attention being
given human rights in the U.S.S.R. in the years since Stalin's death.
In the draft of a new Soviet constitution currently in committee,
there is to be new emphasis upon human rights by placing the
chapter on the subject farther forward in the constitution than was
the case in the 1936 document, 57 and by expanding them to bring
them into accord with the two United Nations Conventions which
58
the U.S.S.R. has ratified.
The Soviet criticism of the Chinese constitution is not limited
to the constitutional abbreviation of the traditional bill of lights; it
goes both to the substance of the rights as they are set forth and to
the means through which they are to be implemented. As to the
substance, the new Chinese bill of rights is found wanting because
it fails to restate the 1954 provisions concerning the equality of all
citizens before the law and the rights of citizens to reside where
they wish and to change their residences at will.
56 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEoPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA arts. 73-84 (1954, repealed
1975), reprinted in Triska 120-21.
'7 See Romashkin, supra note 26.
58 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, id. at 52. Both covenants were ratified by the U.S.S.R. on Oct. 16, 1973.
X U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 1973, at 86.
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As to the method of implementation of rights, criticism is
levelled at the general departure from the provisions of the
Chinese constitution of 1954 that had been similar to those appearing in the Soviet model. Thus, there is no longer included under
freedom of press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration the state's promise to provide the necessary material
facilities to permit enjoyment of these freedoms. Likewise, there is
omitted from the article guaranteeing the right to work, rest, and
leisure, the Soviet model's language, used by the Chinese in 1954,
promising that the state would gradually provide more employment through economic planning, would increase wages, amenities, and benefits, and would improve working conditions. Also,
nothing is now said of a guaranteed eight hour day or of the state's
obligations to prescribe systems of vacations and to expand the
material facilities for rest and health maintenance. The right to
material assistance in old age is also shorn of its guarantee of state
action to provide and expand social insurance, social assistance,
and public health services. Finally, the right to education no longer
includes the state's obligation to provide and expand schools.
Two rights included in the new constitution are seen as undesirable by the Soviet critic: the right to strike, and the protection of
the rights and interests of overseas Chinese. The right to strike is
deplored because it appears to be directed at legitimizing Mao's
instigation of workers to break the factory leadership role of
communist party cadres after Liu Shao-chi's ouster. The attention
given overseas Chinese is interpreted as an attempt to legalize
intervention by the Peking government in the internal affairs of
states where these emigrants live.

VI
NATIONAL TRADITION AND THE SOVIET MODEL

With the provisions of the new constitution and the corresponding Soviet criticism revealed, the stage is set for a conclusion,
tentative though it must be, as to what a professedly MarxistLeninist state must incorporate within its constitution if it is not to
be drummed out of the socialist commonwealth by the current
Soviet leadership. Up to the time of publication of the Soviet
criticism, adherence to traditional form in a state constitution
escaped Soviet comment so long as the constitution reflected a
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content compatible with the fundamental requirements
established
59
by the twelve communist parties in power in 1957.
Since the Soviet critic's article, the question that arises is
whether traditional forms will be tolerated only when they are
variations on western forms and not when, as with the Chinese,
they are notoriously in contrast. The phrasing of the question rests
on the assumption that the 1975 constitution is reflective of the
Chinese legal tradition and that the reader knows how unfamiliar
that tradition is to Westerners. To refresh memories, a few words
may be appropriate.
Comparatists have long categorized the Chinese legal tradition
as unfamiliar to Westerners: indeed, so unfamiliar that it deserves
to be placed in a separate category among the world's legal systems,
along with those of Romanist, English common law, or holy writ
origin. It is agreed that, although Chinese history includes a period
when Emperors ruled by decree covering minute detail, known as
that of the "Legalists," the unique feature of the Chinese public order
system generally is the absence of formal rules adopted either by a
legislature, or created through a system of judicial precedent, or
inscribed in a document inspired by a deity. The force that has held
Chinese society together for centuries is the social norm accepted as a
moral obligation; it is enforced not in the Western manner-through
a system of tribunals applying compulsion-but through a mediator
who serves to remind the errant member of society of his moral
60
obligations.
Even under the rule of the Kuomintang party, which fostered
revision in the 1920's of China's system of social control by the
introduction of formal codes of law and formal courts as a supplement to the mediational system, there was severe resistance in all of
China save in the peripheral areas of the sea coast where foreign
contacts were numerous. For the interior cities and the many
villages of rural China, mediation committees composed of elders
continued to perform an important and recognized function. Similar committees operate in Taiwan today despite the simultaneous
existence of western-style courts.
Movement in Mao's China during the early 1950's toward
codification, formality in the structuring of courts, and constitutionalism suggested that tradition was being overcome. It appeared that the Soviet model had become, if not obligatory, at least
'9. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
60 See Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politicsand Dispute Resolution in Communist China 55
CALIF. L. REv. 1284 (1967). See also R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD TODAY 441 (1968).
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to be preferred by Marxist-inspired revolutionaries intent upon
establishing a new type of state system. Soviet advisers went to
China to assist in the transition, and Chinese students travelled to
the U.S.S.R. to study the Soviet governmental and legal system so
as to return eventually to introduce Soviet concepts of legality into
the Chinese system.
Not until the "anti-rightist movement" began in 1957 did the
situation change. Codification was stopped; judges were dismissed
if they adhered to legal formalities; the jurisdiction of the courts
was severely reduced by transferring the power of resolution of
many civil disputes to administrative bureaus and by conferring the
power of resolution of all but the most serious of crimes on the
police; and Soviet influence was reduced through cessation of
translation of Soviet legal textbooks and withdrawal of Soviet
advisers. 6 1 The impact of these changes was that flexibility in public
control became routine.
The assumption that the Chinese had reverted to tradition was
questioned by those who noted the emergence of the army as a
leading force, if not the dominant one, in the period after 1966.
Strong evidence of the army's increasingly influential position was
the rise to power of its chief, Lin Piao, who became Mao's favorite.
It was speculated that the change in attitude toward institutional
flexibility could be a reflection of attitudes found in many ruling
armies, namely that respect for legal guarantees of citizens' rights
was a hindrance to the efficient exercise of authority.
As Lin Piao's star rose, word came from Chang Kai-shek's
intelligence bureau on Taiwan that a draft for a new constitution
was being circulated on the mainland. This draft was obtained by
intelligence officers and published in 1970.62 It startled the world,
partly because of its extreme simplicity and partly because Lin Piao
was named officially as Mao's heir in Article 2. The evidence
seemed to favor the explanation that it was the army's reverence
for expediency rather than for tradition that accounted for the
new approach.
The expediency theory suffered a blow with Lin Piao's death
in late 1971,63 for the post-Lin constitutional draft, discovered and
61

62

See Cohen, supra note 14.
For English translation of document released by the Central Daily News of Taipei,

Nov. 5, 1970, see 4

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, Jan. 1971, at 100.
63 A Soviet Consul in the United States told me in February 1974 that Soviet doctors

had examined the corpses in the airplane which crashed in the Mongolian People's Republic
in 1971 and had convinced themselves that Lin Piao had not been on the plane. He would
not deny, however, that Lin Piao was dead, stating only that he had not died in the plane
crash as newspapers had reported.
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disclosed by Chang Kai-shek's intelligence officers in 1974, showed
little change.6 4 The new draft was essentially the draft of 1970,
without Lin Piao's name; it remained simple. Again the question
was asked whether this could be explained solely by the theory that
the Chinese leadership was reverting to tradition. When the 1974
draft materialized, with only slight changes, as the officially
adopted constitution of 1975, it began to look as if the reversion
theory could be believed. The Chinese communists had evidenced
their rejection of the Soviet form and reintroduced Chinese tradition in a document that seemed inspired by a desire to maintain a
highly flexible system of social control.
If this theory is valid, why cannot Soviet leaders accept the
document as a manifestation of local tradition rather than a betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist revolution? Judging by the Soviet
critic's constant reference to the continuing preeminence of the
army in China, it may be that the Soviet analysts reject the explanation of those who see the triumph of tradition. They may feel that
the army still wields political power. Also, they may believe that the
Oriental tradition is not as pervasive as some think it is, and can cite
the Korean Democratic Republic's 1972 constitution as proof.
Although Korea shares China's legal tradition, the new Korean
65
constitution essentially follows the Soviet model.
Another possible explanation for Soviet rejection of the revised
document is the new Chinese constitution's attitude toward SinoSoviet friendship. Perhaps no constitution, whether or not following
the Soviet model, can be accepted when it drops a clause that had
hailed the existence of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and the
People's Democracies. If this is true, adherence to the 1954 declaration of the twelve communist parties in power is vitally compromised
with respect to its requirement of acceptance of the principle of
proletarian internationalism. Although this point would not seem to
require a constitutional declaration of friendship, in fact it does so if a
prior constitution which is being replaced made such a declaration.
Granted that the new constitution may be unacceptable to the
Soviet leadership primarily because it reflects several Chinese violations of the basic principles established in 1957 by the twelve
communist parties in power (supremacy of the communist party
over all other forces in the country, proletarian internationalism,
64 English translation puhlished in Background on China, Chinese Information Service (Taiwan), Doc. B.74-13, Sept. 26, 1974.
65 English translation in 2 JOURNAL OF KOREAN AFFAiRs, Jan. 1973, at 46.
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and equality of peoples) 66 there seem to be additional reasons for
rejection. These center around indication of what may be interpreted as a reversion to traditional Chinese forms in the abbreviated and inexplicit articles of the new document. Perhaps the
Soviet leaders see in these forms a potential for flexibility and
unpredictability which disturbs them.
While flexibility and unpredictability were noted components
of the turbulent years of the Russian revolution itself, and while
the Soviet leadership has seemed to be willing to grant the Chinese
a similar period of grace while a new society is being structured,
the Soviet critic is now saying that twenty-five years are more than
enough to create stability. The Soviet communists seem worried
lest the unpredictable situation in China lead to harmful results for
the peoples of the U.S.S.R. What may follow for northern
neighbors if the Chinese Army is not restrained, if the Chinese
leaders are not committed to friendship for the U.S.S.R., and if the
Chinese bureaucracy develops without the controls, which in the
Soviet model provide a potential control over corruption and
arbitrary practices, inherent in an office of Procurator and in mass
participation in state agencies?
While structures designed to assure stability and, therefore, a
measure of predictability might in practice emerge despite their
absence from the constitution, the Soviet critic and those behind
him seem to imply that they would be happier if such structures
were established in clear langnage by the Chinese constitution
itself. Westerners with knowledge of the history of Marxist-Leninist
constitutions may well think the Soviet critic's expression of faith in
the stabilizing potential of a constitution somewhat utopian.
Nevertheless, post-Stalin developments in the U.S.S.R. suggest that
Soviet policy makers remember the perils many of them had
sensed under Stalin's unpredictable and unrestrained hand and
believe that constitutional structures do have a role to play in
preventing reversion to what they call the cult of the individual.
If this is a correct interpretation of current Soviet motivation,
a Chinese constitution with only thirty generally phrased articles is
inadequate. While the Soviet leadership no longer requires states
of the socialist commonwealth to adhere closely to the Soviet model
of draftsmanship, it is skeptical of those that depart significantly,
especially when the departure is accompanied by extrinsic manifestations of hostility to the U.S.S.R. and portents of a future course
6

For a full list of principles to be respected by Communist parties, see text accompany-

ing notes 19-20 supra.
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that diverges sharply from what the Soviet leadership foresees as a
proper one for a healthy Marxist-Leninist society as it comes of
age. The threat to read the Chinese out of the socialist commonwealth is serious indeed, given the fraternal principles on which
the commonwealth is supposed to rest; it indicates that the Chinese
constitution's departure from the established norms cannot be
considered a trivial matter.

